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Real Neurolaw in the Netherlands:
The Role of the Developing Brain in
the New Adolescent Criminal Law
Stephan Schleim*
Theory and History of Psychology, Heymans Institute for Psychological Research, Faculty of Behavioral and Social Sciences,
University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands
Previous publications discussed the conditions under which courts admitted or could
admit neurotechnological evidence like brain scans. There were also first attempts to
investigate legal decisions neuroscientifically. The present paper analyzes a different
way in which neuroscience already influenced the law: The legal justification of the
new Dutch adolescent criminal law explicitly mentions findings on brain development
to justify a higher maximum age for the application of juvenile criminal law than before.
The lawmaker’s reasoning is compared with the neuroscientific studies on which it
is based. In particular, three neurodevelopmental publications quoted by the Dutch
Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice and Protection of Juveniles to justify
that adolescents can be legally less responsible are analyzed in detail. The paper also
addresses possibilities under which brain research could improve legal decision-making
in the future. One important aspect turns out to be that neuroscience should not only
matter on the level of justification, but also provide better instruments on the individual
level of application.
Keywords: neurolaw, legal responsibility, adolescent criminal law, forensic psychiatry, neuroethics
INTRODUCTION
Neuroethics has been introduced as a twofold endeavor: the ethics of neuroscience and the
neuroscience of ethics. The former could be understood as a variation of bio- or medical
ethics, addressing ethical issues involving neurotechnology and the brain (Farah, 2012), the
latter as an extension of moral psychology with instruments like the electroencephalogram,
functional MRI (fMRI), or transcranial magnetic stimulation (Schleim, 2008). Neuroethics
has now been institutionalized with its own journals, trainings, and associations (Leefmann
et al., 2016). Neurolaw could be understood in a similar vein: legal regulation of
neurotechnology on the one hand (Goodenough and Tucker, 2010; Spranger, 2012) and the
neuroscience of legal decision-making on the other (e.g., Schleim et al., 2011). It is yet
less institutionalized than neuroethics, but recently in this journal, Bigenwald and Chambon
(2019) discussed the possible contribution of neuroscience to the law and concluded that
neurotechnology might primarily improve the fact-finding in court. I am demonstrating
in this paper that, beyond such theoretical considerations (Greene and Cohen, 2004), the
Netherlands provide an example of real neurolaw in the sense that the lawmakers essentially
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justified the new adolescent criminal law in effect since 2014
with neuroscientific studies. This might actually be understood
as a third branch of neurolaw: How can and does neuroscience
change the law?
This is not just an abstract debate, as criminal court sentences
involving adolescent offenders have already been and are being
affected: For example, more criminals are sent to juvenile prisons
(Schmidt et al., 2020). The analysis of the legal justification
behind this is particularly relevant to theoretical psychology, too,
as the concepts of responsibility and responsible behavior and
their related cognitive and emotional processes are an essential
mediator between neuroscience and the law in this area. After
investigating the justification of the Dutch legal initiative in detail,
I will discuss some more general aspects concerning the utility of
neuroscience for the law and conclude the paper with an outlook
for the future and possible implications for other legal domains.
NEUROSCIENCE IN THE LEGAL
JUSTIFICATION
Countries differ in how they treat adolescent—meaning the
transition period from child to adulthood—offenders. Llamas
and Marinaro (2020) recently provided an overview of Latin
America, where the minimum age of holding offenders criminally
responsible differs between 12 and 16 years and the maximum
penalty given to adolescents varies between 3 (e.g., Brazil) and
15 (e.g., Costa Rica) years. In Netherlands, where the case
of the present paper takes place, a law becoming effective in
1965 introduced the possibility to sentence 18- to 20-year-
old offenders according to the rules for juvenile offenders,
aged 12 to 17 years (Barendregt and van der Laan, 2019).
These rules emphasize pedagogical goals over punitive aims.
With the law in effect since April 1, 2014, the maximum
age for this has been increased to 22 years1, while at the
same time increasing the maximum sentence and introducing
new possibilities for indefinite detention for the most serious
adolescent offenders (Schmidt et al., 2020). Relevant for the
purpose of the present paper is the justification of the new law,
which I will summarize next.
In 2010, the newly formed government of Netherlands decided
to address the problem of adolescent offenders more seriously.
The following year, the State Secretary of Security and Justice
presented a proposal, arguing that 15- to 23-year-olds committed
30% of the offenses. The State Secretary wrote:
“Research shows that many psychological functions which are
important for the formation of socially desired behavior come
to a full development only after the 20th year of age. This
concerns, among others, the inhibition of impulses, the realization
and consideration of long-term consequences, the regulation
of emotions, and the development of empathic capacities.
Considering the fact that these functions are not yet completely
1The literature sometimes speaks of 23 years as a maximum age, which was one of
the proposals before passing the law. As the translation of the respective article of
the Dutch Criminal Code provided below will make clear, though, the possibility
is restricted to offenders before reaching the age of 23, i.e., up to a maximum of
22 years.
developed in adolescents, rule-breaking behavior and criminality
occur relatively frequent in adolescents.”2
This suggests a causal link between the developmental
stage of the said psychological faculties and offensive behavior.
Another year later, the State Secretary presented the proposal
for the new adolescent criminal law, including the following
justification, where neuroscience and the brain enter the
stage:
“The recent scientific findings related to the development of
important brain functions during adolescence lend support for
the intention to reach an independent treatment of adolescents.
These insights come from developmental psychology and are
confirmed by more recent neurobiological research. They are
briefly summarized by the Council for the Administration of
Criminal Justice and Protection of Juveniles with proposals for
introducing a youth criminal law. That particular risk behavior
occurs between the age of 15 and 23 can also be attributed to
an incomplete development of important brain functions. The
core of what science teaches about this is that the psychological
development of adolescents does not stop when they reach
18 years of age and that essential developments only occur
thereafter. The still incomplete emotional, social, moral, and
intellectual development is a partial cause of the situation that
a big part of (youth) criminality occurs during adolescence,
but also ends before the 23rd year of age. [. . .] Modern
research on the functioning of the brain aided by scanning
techniques is said to explain that adolescents let themselves be
guided more by brain parts reacting to immediate reward than
adults.”3
Besides the psychological faculties previously mentioned (like
inhibition of impulses or emotion regulation), the justification
here also refers to an increased susceptibility to peer pressure and
lack of autonomy. We thus see that the lawmaker implies an even
stronger link between brain development and offensive behavior
than before. The quoted portion contains all (four) references to
the brain of the justification of the new law4. To better understand
the science behind this argument, I shall finally quote part of the
proposal by the said Council, from the section “The psychological
and biological development of the young”:
“Thus the growth of the young continues approximately until
the 16th to 18th year. The gray matter of the brain develops
earlier: An increased growth of the brain is reported until
14 to 15 years of age. Just around the 25th year prefrontal
cortex functions such as planning and flexibility are completely
grown. [. . .] This means that specific risk behavior often
occurring among adolescents between the 15th and 23rd year
is partially caused by the incomplete development of particular
important brain functions. The most essential development
with respect to these brain functions only occurs after the
20th year. [. . .] Research on the functioning of the brain
using scanning techniques shows that adolescents let themselves
2Translated from Dutch, Kamerstuk 28 741 Nr. 17 d.d. 25 juni 2011, p. 2.
3Translated from Dutch, Kamerstuk 33 498 Nr. 3 d.d. 13 December 2012,
pp. 12–13.
4For those unfamiliar with the neurolaw literature, it is important to know that
even fewer and less direct references to neuroscience/the brain in the past have
sparked a hot debate on the legal relevance of neuroscience (Schleim, 2019).
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often be controlled by a brain region reacting to immediate
rewards, the nucleus accumbens, while the brain of persons
older than 25 years show a stronger activation in the amygdala
and prefrontal cortex. This lets the latter group consider
the long-term consequences more in dangerous situations.
[. . .] Only when the prefrontal cortex has fully matured, the
adolescents are better capable of regulating their emotions
than before that time. [. . .] It can be concluded that the
development of adolescents usually is not completed until the
23rd year.”5
Before discussing the actual neuroscientific publications on
which these claims are based in the next section, let us see the
article of the Dutch Criminal Code as it was finally passed by the
parliament and came into effect on April 1, 2014, based on the
justification presented above:
“Regarding the young adult who, at the moment of committing
the punishable act, has reached the age of 18, but not yet 23 years,
the judge can judge according to articles 77 g to 77 hh, if he
finds reasons for this in the personality of the offender or the
circumstances in which the act is committed.”6
The further articles referred to here (77 g to 77 hh) are
the—usually more mild and pedagogic—regulations for juvenile
offenders, such as doing social work or serving the sentence in a
juvenile prison. Procedural regulations not discussed here already
allow a different placement before the trial and the transfer of
the case to a dedicated youth court. More of these practical
aspects have been discussed in earlier publications (e.g., Schmidt
et al., 2020). It is interesting to note that the Dutch judges
also relate to the brain in their public explanation of the new
adolescent criminal law: “The thought is that as long as the brain
is in development, the behavior of the suspect can be corrected
maximally. Thus the chance of recidivism becomes as small as
possible.”7 They praise the new regulations as allowing tailor-
made solutions for individual offenders. Let us thus have a closer
look at the neuroscientific evidence.
ANALYZING THE NEUROSCIENTIFIC
STUDIES
As we have seen in the previous section, the legal justification
referred to a report by the Dutch Council for the Administration
of Criminal Justice and Protection of Juveniles, a public
advisory institution. The report cites several criminological and
psychological papers besides three peer-reviewed neuroscientific
publications (Paus et al., 2001; Adleman et al., 2002; Casey et al.,
2005), which already were a bit dated at the moment of its
publication (i.e., 2011). What were these neuroscientific studies
about and what did they find?
5Translated from Dutch, Advies “Het jeugdstrafproces: toekomstbestendig” d.d. 14
maart 2011, p. 18. Here I omitted the references, which will be discussed in the next
section.
6Translated from Dutch, article 77c, first paragraph.
7Translated from Dutch, https://www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie-en-contact/
Rechtsgebieden/Strafrecht/Paginas/Adolescentenstrafrecht.aspx (accessed on
April 5, 2020).
Adleman et al. (2002) let subjects carry out the Stroop color
word task, a classical psychological test for cognitive control, in
an fMRI scanner. In this task, an impulsive reaction must be
inhibited. The researchers compared three age groups, children
(7–11 years, N = 8), adolescents (12–16 years, N = 11), and young
adults (18–22 years, N = 11). They report that three areas in the
prefrontal cortex were significantly more activated in the young
adults than in the adolescents and that there was a similar pattern
when comparing the young adults and the children; comparing
the adolescents and the children did not yield such a result.
Much has been written about the statistical nature of such
findings before and how this limits a direct translation to
practical applications (Schleim and Roiser, 2009; Bigenwald and
Chambon, 2019). But even as we take the findings as they are,
there is a problem with respect to the legal justification: The new
law introduces more possibilities to treat people in the age group
12 to 22 years similarly, but the fMRI scan yielded significant
differences. In addition, the study cannot say anything about the
upper threshold introduced in the new law because no subjects
older than 22 were investigated. Finally, and more secondarily,
that no differences were found between adolescents and children,
whom the law treats differently, also does not support the legal
age categories on the lower boundary.
The paper by Casey et al. (2005) is a review summarizing
several studies on human brain development. They do not
present much evidence in favor of specific age categories—
and where they do, referring to a review by Thompson and
Nelson (2001)—they say that the brain of a 6-year-old already
amounts to 90% of the volume of an adult’s brain and that
sensomotoric, associative, and prefrontal brain regions are almost
completely developed by the age of 16. This obviously contradicts
the reasoning of the legal justification, which emphasizes the
continuous brain development until at least the age of 25,
particularly of the prefrontal cortex. Casey and colleagues also
emphasize the limitations of brain scans and caution against
premature conclusions8.
The third and last neuroscientific paper quoted in support
of the new legislation (Paus et al., 2001) is also a review paper
and particularly discusses structural findings in people until the
age of 30. The authors show two things: First, there seem to be
developmental brain processes continuing until at least the age of
30; second, there are big inter-individual differences within each
age group. The latter means that, for example, the corpus callosum
connecting both hemispheres of a 6-year-old can be bigger than
that of a 16-year-old. In support of the new legislation, one
could say that the developmental processes seem to decrease the
older one gets. However, these processes change gradually on a
continuum and not in a categorical way, raising the question:
How different would the brain processes or structures between
two age groups have to be to justify a legal difference? This brings
me to the next section, in which I will discuss some more general
questions relevant to neurolaw.
8In a newer review paper that was published after the Council’s report and in which
Cohen and Casey (2014) explicitly discuss implications for adolescent criminal law,
they summarize the study by Dreyfuss et al. (2014) who compared 13- to 17- with
18- to 27-year-olds in an experiment on impulsivity. The significant differences
they report about these two groups also contradict the intention of the new law.
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THE UTILITY OF NEUROLAW
The previous section showed clearly that the neuroscientific
evidence quoted in favor of the new adolescent criminal law
in Netherlands does not support the new legal age thresholds.
This does not leave these categories scientifically unjustified,
but just shows that the neuroscientific studies presented by
the Council and implicitly by the State Secretary do not
match the intention of the lawmaker. The Council’s report
quotes criminological and psychological evidence as well, but
analyzing this goes beyond the purview of this paper. Morse
(2006) coined the notion of a “brain overclaim syndrome,”
which is now used by many who are criticizing exaggerated
claims derived from neuroscience. The example analyzed in this
paper is particularly odd in that the neuroscientific findings,
on closer investigation, obviously contradict the claims in the
legal justification. In the remainder of this section, I will
present some thoughts on how a neuroscientifically justified
law could be developed and what the prospects of such an
endeavor are:
Most importantly, legal responsibility is not a neuroscientific
category. Philosophers and forensic psychiatrists have analyzed
before how different understandings of responsibility could be
linked to the brain (Vincent, 2011, 2015; Meynen, 2014, 2016).
A translation process between the domains must thus occur.
This will necessarily involve an intermediary step of responsible
behavior. Imagine that members of one age group generally
show more irresponsible behavior than that of another age
group. We may assume that this somehow relates to these
groups’ developmental phases, including brain development.
Whether an understanding of the neural processes underlying
these behavioral differences is more informative than the already
available developmental–psychological and behavioral evidence
is an open question. A major contribution to the practical
application in legal cases would be if neurotechnology allowed
an estimation of someone’s legal responsibility in an individual
case. For this, findings much stronger than the statistically
significant differences between groups discussed in the previous
section would have to be available. For the time being, we
can have a look at psychiatry, where the lacking contribution
of neuroscience to clinical practice has been discussed more
critically in recent years (Frisch, 2016; Schleim, 2018, 2020;
Gardner and Kleinman, 2019). Although there are thousands of
neuroscientific studies reporting significant differences between
patients and healthy controls or different groups of patients, not
a single psychiatric disorder described in the common clinical
manuals can reliably be diagnosed by a brain scan or another
biological test.
Article 77c of the Dutch Criminal Code, as quoted previously,
allows to apply the rules for juveniles when the “personality of
the offender or the circumstances” of the criminal acts provide
sufficient reason. Legal scholars found that public prosecutors,
who can submit such a request to the court, do so rather on
the basis of their intuition or pragmatic criteria such as whether
the young offenders are still living with their parents, attending
school, or having intellectual disabilities, and that judges seem to
take their decisions in an inconsistent way:
“So far, unclarity and inconsistency remain regarding the
applicable target group, type and severity of offences. [. . .] The
lack of legislative guidance has transformed the proposed flexible
system, with ample discretion for the professionals involved,
into a system in which uncertainty and inequality can prevail.”
(Schmidt et al., 2020: 15).
Although the new Dutch adolescent criminal law is a real case
of neurolaw in the sense that it is justified neuroscientifically,
that is, it makes use of brain research on the level of justification,
it does not provide any neuroscientific guidance on the level
of application. I think that this is the law’s major flaw: It tells
people, in particular public prosecutors and judges, something
about brain development, but does not give them any tools to
assess it. I am not denying the availability of such a tool in the
future; all I am saying is that given the situation in psychiatry,
for which there has been much more research with respect to
clinical application in individual cases, such a possibility seems
unlikely in the near future. If judges could see on a brain scan
how criminally responsible an offender is—at the moment of
committing the crime—that would be the real game changer for
legal practice. In such a scenario, fixed age boundaries might
be given up completely, enabling a tailor-made approach doing
maximum justice to each individual.
CONCLUSION
Scholars of different disciplines and countries discussed in much
detail if and how courts made use of neuroscientific evidence
(e.g., Schleim, 2011, 2012, 2019; Spranger, 2012; Farahany, 2015;
Hoffman, 2018; Greely and Farahany, 2019). To my knowledge,
neuroscience has never before influenced lawmaking in such a
direct and explicit way as in the new Dutch adolescent criminal
law. However, according to my analysis, the mismatch between
the quoted neuroscientific evidence and the legal justification
as well as the lack of practical applications call this initiative
into question. A general problem is that the criminal law in
most (if not all) countries uses fixed age thresholds to make
categorical distinctions, whereas neuroscience finds differences of
brain development on a continuum. This will make every fixed
age look somewhat arbitrary from a scientific point of view9.
Further questions related to other domains might be raised: If the
age at which adolescents have to be held fully legally responsible
is ever more increased, this might have implications for how
we think about their capability to make contracts or consent
to medical procedures as well (Meynen, 2016). Signing for a
life insurance, for example, also implies a subject’s capacity for
long-term planning. Should these ultimately also be evaluated
on an individual basis? And which role does psychological and
9One reviewer raised the valid point that the brain differences between young
adults until 22 years and older people need not be clear in all cases to inform
the law, but that an 85% certainty would already be sufficient. I agree. But then
we still have the problem that the study by Casey et al. (2005) reported that the
development of sensomotoric, associative, and prefrontal brain regions is almost
complete by the age of 16; and that Paus et al. (2001) found that brain development
continues until at least the age of 30. We would thus still need an independent
normative argument for how much difference in brain development is sufficient to
justify a difference on the legal level, which goes beyond the scope of this paper.
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neuroscientific evidence play for these rules, presently and in the
future? These are intriguing questions which must be addressed
on another occasion, though.
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